The end of the Great Patriotic War: prerequisites and course of events

Тable of contents

Introduction………………………………………………………………….3

1. The end of the Great Patriotic War: prerequisites and course of events…………………………………………………………………..……5

2. The end of the World War II: military and political course of events………………………………………………………………..………8

3. Aftermath of World War II from the USSR and West: immediate effects……………………………………………………………………..….10

Сonclusion………………………………………………………………….13

Glossary ………………….………………………………………………...15

List of sources used………………………………………………………...21

Introduction

It has been 70 years since the end of World War II. And most people would assume that the broad outlines of that terrible conflict had been established a long since. Innumerable books have been published on the subject. Thousands of films have been screened, portraying every aspect of the military events. Hundreds of monuments and museums have been created to keep the memory of the war alive. At least, one is tempted to think that way until one starts to examine what actually is said and what is not said.

World War II had a tremendous impact on the destinies of mankind. It was attended by 72 States (80% of the world population). Military operations were conducted in 40 countries. The armed forces were mobilized 110 million people. Total casualties reached 60-65 million people, of them were killed at the front of 27 million people, many of them citizens of the USSR. Also, large human losses suffered China, Germany, Japan and Poland.

The prevailing view of the above Germany as the main culprit for the war today looks very unconvincing in the light of recently declassified documents. The declassified today, the documents give a right to claim the existence of pre-war Europe is not one, but two hotbeds of war, And even now it is difficult to argue which of them was more aggressive.

Previous view rested on the indisputable fact: that Germany started the Second World War and Russian in particular. But this interpretation is given without objective studies of the processes taking place in the Soviet Union before the war. Available now allow documents to shed light on the true causes of the emergence and spread of the conflict.

The catastrophic results of the war against the fascist bloc countries could not doubt Germany has lost more than 8 million. Man suffered a nuclear attack, Japan, Italy was in ruins. But let's turn our attention to the so-called winners.

Let us recall what Western countries have allowed Germany to restore its economy and army. Germany had to act as a kind of shield against the penetration of communism in Europe, and in the future instrument for its total destruction. Western countries are not unduly worried about the Soviet Union harboring plans for a new reorganization of the world. Of course, at some stage, Germany is out of control and admittedly with the help of the Soviet Union. With what result came to Western countries after World War II? Half of Europe at least for forty years was under the complete control of the Soviet Union.

But an even greater defeat suffered Soviet Union. Based on the objectives, the conquest of Europe was only the first stage in the development of the world revolution. German preemptive strike, absolutely senseless and self-destructive in terms of the ratio of military and economic potential, allowed to delay the "liberation" of the Soviet Union in Europe for four years. In the bloody World War II the Soviet Union suffered enormous human and material losses, and still came out of it much stronger than the others powers. But time was lost. The United States has a new super-powerful weapon, to enable them to nullify all subsequent attempts of the Soviet Union to arrange a new redivision of the world. Stalin had to confine ourselves to half of Europe and part of Asia.

As we can see, none of the countries could achieve its goals and objectives, so it would be wrong to talk of any country as victors of the Second World War.

The debate about the role of the Soviet Union in World War II remains open. Is he ready to strike against Germany? Based on the documents, we can confidently assert that they are ready. But of course, this view is not accepted at least in the near future, because its adoption would require a revision of pre-war and post-war history across the country for several generations.

The end of the Great Patriotic War: prerequisites and course of events

After reviewing all of its strategic options, the Stavka began planning the Red Army’s winter campaign in late October 1944. The victories of the summer and fall had created a much more favorable situation for Red Army offensive action; the overall length of the main front shortened from over 1,000 miles to 780 miles, significant German forces uselessly isolated in Courland and Budapest, and the Soviet Union clearly held the strategic initiative. Soviet intelligence estimates indicated that, during 1944, 96 German divisions had been captured or destroyed, and another 33 so weakened that they were disbanded. Still, even the seemingly inexhaustible strength of the Soviet Union had its limits, and the planners sought a means for rapid and relatively bloodless victory. The shortened front meant that the Red Army could conduct fewer but far more powerful offensives to accomplish its objectives of seizing Berlin and destroying Nazi Germany.

This was necessary since German defenses thickened as Red Army forces advanced west. In addition, Stalin restructured his command and control methods to insure greater efficiency. In late October he decided to control the Red Army’s operating fronts directly from Moscow, dispensing with the Stavka representatives and coordinators who had represented it in the field during the previous three years. Instead, he restructured his forces for the new offensives into a smaller number of extremely powerful fronts and reshuffled his front commanders. The 1st Belorussian Front, now personally commanded by Zhukov, was to advance directly on Berlin with Konev’s 1^st Ukrainian Front advancing on a parallel course just to its south. The 2^nd Belorussian Front, now under Rokossovsky’s command, was to advance westward north of the Vistula River toward Danzig and Pomerania to protect the 1st Belorussian Front’s right flank.

Based upon the plan formulated by the Stavka, the Red Army conducted a two stage operation to destroy Hitler’s Third Reich. First, as described above, Malinovsky’s 2^nd and Tolbukhin’s 3^rd Ukrainian Fronts continued their advance in Hungary during November and December to draw German reserves away from the Warsaw-Berlin axis. Then the main offensive, which was tentatively scheduled to begin between 15 and 20 January 1945 but began on 13 January to relieve German pressure on the Allies in the Battle of the Bulge, shattered the Germans’ Vistula and East Prussian defenses in two large-scale operations. The lesser of these attacks, conducted by Cherniakhovsky’s 3^rd and Rokossovsky’s 2^nd Belorussian Fronts, performed the difficult task of clearing Army Group Center from East Prussia. While the former bulled its way westward through the German defenses towards Konigsberg, the latter, with a single tank army (the 5th Guards), enveloped East Prussia from the south and protected the 1^st Belorussian Front’s right flank. At the same time, Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian and Konev’s 1^st Ukrainian Fronts, each spearheaded by two tank armies (the 1^st and 2^nd Guards and the 3^rd and 4^th Guards, respectively), conducted main offensive across Poland against German Army Group “A,” to which Hitler had assigned responsibility for defending the vital Warsaw-Berlin axis.

Both offensives achieved immediate and spectacular success. After utterly shattering Army Group “A’s” defenses opposite their bridgeheads, the 1^st Belorussian and 1^st Ukrainian Fronts’ forces pushed aside German panzer reserves and raced westward with their four tank armies far in advance. The Wehrmacht’s front in Poland vaporized, and by 1 February the lead elements of the 1^st and 2^nd Guards Tank Armies captured bridgeheads over the Oder River only 36 miles from Berlin. To the south, the 1^st Ukrainian Front kept pace, reaching and crossing the Oder north and south of Breslau. In their wake thousands of Wehrmacht troops remained helplessly encircled in numerous pockets and bypassed cities and towns.

To the north, Rokossovsky’s 2^nd and Cherniakhovsky’s 3^rd Belorussian Fronts smashed Army Group Center’s defenses in East Prussia and, by the end of January, isolated the remnants of the army group in a pocket around the city of Konigsberg. However, the 2^nd Belorussian Front was not able to smash totally German defenses in the Danzig region of eastern Pomerania, leaving a sizable German force hanging threateningly over the 1st Belorussian Front’s left flank. Given the twin threats posed to the 1^st Belorussian Front by Wehrmacht forces in Pomerania and in Silesia to the south, on 2 February Stalin ordered Zhukov and Konev to halt their offensives until their flanks could be secured. Subsequently, the Red Army mounted four major and several minor offensives in February and March designed to clear Wehrmacht forces from Pomerania and Silesia. During this period, the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts eliminated the threat in Silesia, and the 1st Ukrainian Front did the same in Silesia.

To the south in Hungary, from 6-15 March 1945, Hitler conducted his final offensive of the war by launching his Sixth SS Army in a dramatic but futile attempt to crush Red Army defenses west of Budapest and protect the vital Balaton oilfields. Just as this offensive faltered in mid-March, the Malinovsky’s 2^nd and Tolbukhin’s 3^rd Ukrainian Fronts launched another major offensive and several minor offensives against the depleted forces of Army Group South, driving them from Hungary and Slovakia and liberating Vienna on 13 April, only three days before the Red Army began its onslaught against Berlin.

In late January 1945, when it appeared that Zhukov’s 1^st Belorussian and Konev’s 1^st Ukrainian Fronts were about to reach the Oder River within striking distance of Berlin, Stalin ordered both fronts to prepare subsequent operations to capture Berlin. Contrary to existing Russian accounts that claim Stalin halted the fronts’ Berlin offensive on 2 February, the 1^st Ukrainian Front began the operation only to abandon Berlin as an objective on 10 February. It remains unclear whether increased German resistance or a military or political decision by made Stalin prompted the abrupt end to the February offensive against Berlin.

In accordance with the Stavka’s strategic plan for the spring campaign, the Red Army dealt first with Army Group Vistula defending Berlin and only then engaged Army Group Center in Czechoslovakia. The Red Army’s objectives were limited to those boundaries that had already been mutually agreed upon with the Allies. Three reinforced fronts took part in the Berlin offensive. Zhukov’s 1^st Belorussian Front attacked directly toward Berlin from the Kustrin bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder River to envelop the city from the north, Konev’s 1^st Ukrainian Front thrust across the Oder to the south to envelop Berlin from the southwest, and, to the north, Rokossovsky’s 3^rd Belorussian Front attacked across the Oder several days later to destroy German in the coastal plain north of Berlin and link up with Allied forces along the Elbe River. The ensuing struggle, in particular, the advance by Zhukov’s front into Berlin proper was prolonged and bloody, but ended on 7 and 8 May when Red Army forces linked up with Allied forces along the Elbe River and Wehrmacht forces in Germany capitulated. During the course of the Berlin operation, Red Army forces crushed the remnants of Army Group Vistula and captured 480,000 German troops. The cost, however, had been great as 361,367 Soviet and Polish soldiers fell in the effort. While three Red Army fronts conducted the climactic Berlin offensive, other Red Army forces completed the liberation of Austria and liquidated resisting pockets of German forces in Courland and on the Samland Peninsula, west of Konigsberg. The 2^nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts liberated Vienna from Army Group South, captured Brno, Czechoslovakia and approached Graz, Austria. The 1^st and 2^nd Baltic Fronts destroyed the remnants of Army Group North (renamed Army Group Courland on 26 January) in Courland, seizing up to 100,000 prisoners. Finally, and the 3rd Belorussian Front liquidated the remaining forces of former Army Group Center (renamed Operational Group Samland) in the Samland pocket west of Konigsberg, taking another 189,000 prisoners.

As early as 1 May, the Stavka ordered Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front to relieve all elements of Konev’s 1^st Ukrainian Front engaged in mopping up in Berlin so that Konev’s forces could turn southwestward and, in conjunction with the Malinovsky’s 2^nd and Eremenko’s 4^th Ukrainian Fronts, advance on Prague against the Red Army’s old nemesis, Army Group Center, whose 600,000 men awaited inevitable destruction, ironically, not in Germany, but in Czechoslovakia, which had been one of Hitler’s initial victims.

While the Reichstag was still under assault, between 1 and 6 May, the 1^st, 4^th and 2^nd Ukrainian Fronts regrouped their forces and began their rapid advance toward Prague. The combined force of over 2 million Soviet and Polish soldiers relied heavily on tank forces, including three tank armies and a cavalry-mechanized group, to spearhead a rapid thrust directly on the Czech capital. According to the hastily formulated plan, the 1^st Ukrainian Front attacked west of Dresden, penetrate the Erzgeberg Mountain passes in southern east Germany, and committed two tank armies (the 3^rd Guards and 4^th Guards) in the rapid dash to Prague. Polish and Soviet forces under the 1st Ukrainian Front’s control launched a supporting attack in the Gorlitz sector, and simultaneously, the 2^nd and 4^th Ukrainian Fronts launched tank-heavy offensives toward Prague in a wide arc spanning the eastern and southern frontiers of Czechoslovakia. The forward detachments of the 1^st Ukrainian Front’s 3^rd and 4^th Guards Tank Armies captured Prague on 9 May. During the following two days, Red Army forces accepted the surrender of more than 600,000 German troops of Army Group Center. On 11 May the lead elements of the 4th Guards Tank Army linked up with the Third U.S. Army east of Pilsen, ending the major wartime field operations of the Red Army. [1]