September, 1996 - Vladimir

Well, I've been here for about two weeks, and have gathered enough infor­mation to continue writing again. It is very difficult to describe this place. It's hard to begin. At times there is so much to say that I in fact have nothing at all to say.

The streets are rather neglected. There are no storm drains, and when it rains, the water simply gathers, making small pools out of the numerous pot holes, as well as washes down the street, making walking a somewhat dirty experience

Transport is reliable, however, the number of passengers is truly unreal. I can't even estimate just how many people manage to ride these buses. It's truly in­humane. There must be triple the amount of passengers than these buses were de—signed to hold. It is like a third world-country. The view could only be topped if people actually rode on top of the buses like they do in India or in Sub-Saharan Af­rica for example.

Russians don't seem to be very orderly. They don't line up at windows or counters in stores. They do not enter the bus one at a time, but instead push and shove their way on board. This idea of closeness is also seen in their daily interac­tions with one another. They tend to stand practically on top of you when speaking. On the bus, there is no choice but to push and shove, considering how many people are packed together. Yet, there rarely seems to be any anger about it. What bothers people is when you briefcase or backpack nudges someone.

I've noticed that people don't really smile here. Unless they are with friends or family members, people have a very harsh look on their faces. Russian service people are some of the rudest people I've met. They are very impatient with cus­tomers and show how they feel, not only through gestures of indifference, but will tell you straight out what you have done to anger them. I've never seen a smile in a store. Sales people make you feel as if you are bothering them for having to serve you. You can't help but bother these people. The stores are arranged so that all of the goods on sale are behind the counter. You must therefore ask for every item. Asking to have a look at something without buying it causes more problems than it's worth. Paying for your items is also less than friendly, convenient, or efficient for that matter. You must first push your way to the front of the line, tell the sales person what you want and then wait while they add it up for you. Then you must wait in a different line in order to pay for the thing you want to buy. Finally, you take the receipt, stand in the first line again in order to pick up your goods, present your receipt to the saleswoman, who then thoroughly scrutinizes it, shoves your goods towards you (which you yourself must pack up), while someone else pushes up against you trying to get her attention.

It's also interesting that Russians don't manicure their grass, hushes, or trees on the street, or even in the parks for that matter. Everything just grows wild -weeds and all. By September, everything is very overgrown. Mixed in with this wilderness in the city is garbage - lots of garbage. It's difficult actually to find a trash can. Maybe that's why people apparently just through their trash on the ground.

However, another huge contrast can be made. Although Russians on the street interacting with strangers can be harsh, lack emotion, and boarder on being down right rude, Russians to whom they know are more generous, caring and hos­pitable than any other people I've met. While with Russians you don't know, you have this feeling that they would hesitate to help you, even if you were being mugged.

Can you predict what will shock a foreigner from the target culture in Be­larus? Get into groups of four or five and find people who think that the fol­lowing things will surprise an American and write their names next to each situation.

· Kissing three times when meeting

· Using “uncle”, “aunt” or “granny” addressing to unknown people

· uncertainty in decision making

· children wearing school uniforms

· parties

· buses

Continue the list of situations which provoke culture shock in this country. Speak to informants, if necessary.

A MAN OF THE PEOPLE

"Vodka, matryoshka and caviar" is far from the whole story of Russia.

By Anna Vinter

HERE ARE CERTAIN phenomena that have become the trademark features of various coun­tries: in France they are the Eiffel Tower, perfume and champagne; in America — the Stat­ue of Liberty, Mac-Donalds and Coca-Cola; in Spain — "Carmen", bull­fighting and flamenco. Since Russia became widely accessible to tourists, the words "vodka", "matryoshka" and "caviar" have always followed on auto­matically and have stuck. As many peo­ple probably already know, however, that is far from all the "folk" characteris­tics. Vodka is not at all what St. Petersburg resi­dents drink morning, noon and night, we don't eat caviar around the clock and the matryoshka doll is not the only souvenir that tourists can take home with them. Without mentioning the rich cultural traditions reflected in productions at our numerous theatres, concert halls and museums, we could talk about the north­ern capital's spiritual heritage as captured on the canvases of local artists, the wooden objects painted in Khokhloma style, the splendid jewellery, the famous Gzhel pottery and a great deal else that is suitable to be bought and displayed in homes at the other end of the world as a souvenir of Russia.

As well as all these things, one of the main focuses of attraction is the Russian himself, as he has been portrayed to the rest of the world for centuries — ignorant, unedu­cated Ivan in felt boots and a fur cap with ear-flaps; it is these attributes of life in the far north that arouse a burning interest. Tourists who come to St. Petersburg in winter immediately arm themselves with a fur cap, whose warm ear-flaps, usually tied with tapes on top, can be tied under the chin on really cold days and will offer per­manent protection against the biting wind and the frost that nips at the nose. Although the popularity of this headgear amongst the local population is gradually waning, Russians' greatest pride 20 years ago were hard musquash hats with flaps for men and soft suede hats with polar fox fur for women. It should be noted that there are various types of fur hats. The one found most often on souvenir stalls is a black one made from rabbit fur; it has quilted wadding on the inside, while the outside can be either of fur (in which case the ear-flaps, the skull part and the peak have fur on both sides) or of leather, suede or coarse cloth with a fur peak and ear-flaps. In shops, meanwhile, you can find genuine masterpieces made from the rarest types of fur.

Felt boots have become no less popu­lar, though mainly those from Russian designers; it was they who had the idea of creating real "haute couture" footwear from a simple pair of felt boots. Remem­bering that felt boots have been worn in Russia since time immemorial — Peter I liked them for their medicinal properties, Catherine the Great had soft boots made from delicate black wool, and both Lenin and Stalin were glad of them while in exile in Siberia — the designers have decided to revive old traditions and sup­port Russian culture. The celebrities of the world's fashion business have most probably already noticed the dear little light, absurd and childlike felt bootees, and real followers of fashion will be happy to take a made-to-order pair of warm felt boots home with them, either to use them as an item of decoration or to strut around the streets in them. Just bear in mind that in winter galoshes are worn over felt boots.

RUSSIAN MENTALITY

On March 19, 2002, at the Rosbalt News Agency, Zinaida Sikevich, a reputed sociologist from St. Petersburg, presented her analytical report 'Ten Years of Russia's Reforms as Seen by Her Citizens'. The materials Mrs. Sikevich presented concerned the specifics of Russia's - and St. Petersburg's - society. The following is the abridged version of that report. When speaking of Russia's mentality, one must consider that it was forcibly broken twice within the past century. For the first time it happened during the Bolsheviks' 'modernisation' and 'the forming of the Soviet man'. Then, in the end of 1980s, the consciousness of the Soviet man was speedily transformed to fit into the liberal model of values.

Figuratively, Russian mentality is like a two-ply cake. The Bolsheviks broke down the preceding political institutions of Russia and cleverly adjusted the people's everyday notions to the new reality. They instilled in the minds the priority of 'labour collective' over individual interests and the idea of equality as the equivalent of the levelled distribution of incomes. Russia's Christian Orthodox self-identification was transformed into class self-identification and the belief in the Kingdom of God was replaced with that in the inevitable coming of Communism. This is why now the system of liberal values is opposed not just by the Soviet but also by the traditional Russian psychology.

The core of the traditional and mostly unconscious Russian outlook is the belief in favourable fate and the hope that things will 'somehow work out'. This is why 83.6% of all respondents in a poll conducted in St. Petersburg in 2000 agreed with the old saying 'whatever is done is for the better', singling it out of 42 proverbs offered. These words are the quintessence of the typical Russian optimistic fatalism coexisting with passivity and non-interference with life that goes on as if 'all by itself, while people think, 'All I can do is hope' or 'Let's hope for some luck'. This position is the polar opposite of the basic reliance on individual initiative typical for the Protestant ethics, according to which one must make oneself and one's life.

The other basic element of Russian mentality is the peculiar interpretation of the value of the freedom of will understood as non-restricted self-assertion with no regard for anyone else. In Russian mentality, fatalism and will compete unceasingly and yet, paradoxically as it may sound, rather add to than oppose one another. I believe these are the ancestral myths comprising the social forms of the collective unconscious, in which conscious values, the idea of the norm and social expectations are rooted.

According to the results of research done between the years 1996 and 2000 by the Laboratory of Ethnic Sociology and Psychology of the St. Petersburg State University, the basic values of the Russian people include the following: egalitarianism, collectivism as a preference for group as opposed to individual self-identification, paternalism and the Russian version of etatism, that is, adherence to strong consolidating state.

Egalitarianism is interpreted as the rejection of the social stratification of the modern society. The mass consciousness adheres to the traditional approach to wealth. Of the total number of respondents in a 1997 poll in St. Petersburg, 66.3% agree with the saying 'Honest work won't grow your stock'. A content analysis of responses involving the words 'socialism' and 'capitalism', meaning the Russian forms of these two economic and political systems, revealed that 28.8% of all respondents believe the largest merit of the gone-by regime was equality among people, which some of them called social justice, while 29.6% said inequality was the largest flaw of the present system.

For its supporters socialism represents not only justice but also 'true freedom' and 'happy life', while capitalism is to them a phantom society where everything is untrue, where instead of freedom there is only its semblance, civil rights existing on paper only and life itself being illusory. While the former system 'held social guarantees for everyone', as believed by 12.3% of the respondents, the present one, according to 6.9%, is 'the sinecure of thieves' where 'only bandits and thieves thrive¹. Besides, many think socialism means 'the power of the people', existing for the people and in the interests of the people, while capitalism is 'the power of money', that is, of the rich.

Continuing with the poll, the supporters of the present system are all young people, mostly highly educated, residing in St. Petersburg. In provincial Russia, there is a lot of nostalgia for socialism. In the town of Michurinsk, the Tambov Region, where a control group was polled, 74.4% of the respondents supported socialism and only 25.6% supported capitalism.

Equality represents the lost Eden' where 'all were together for better or for worse'. People were 'brethren', each 'feeling the elbow of the next man'. Inequality is bad in that it sanctifies 'exploitation', 'justice for the chosen' and 'contempt for the poor'. That is, inequality is 'Eden for some and hell for the rest'. The use of biblical notions shows that in all their outward atheism the Soviet man always remained a profound believer, except Eden for him was replaced by communism with 'plenty of everything for everyone'.

Considering that 10 years is too short a time for basic values to change, it is easy to understand that the mobility of social statuses and the income-based division of people, the opposite of the basic value of collectivism, causes in many people the sense of uncertainty and of the instability of their personal lives. Interestingly, according to the results of the aforementioned poll where folk proverbs were used as associations, 71% agreed with the one saying 'My pocket is lean, yet my soul is clean', only 29% identifying with its opposite, 'Money in my purse makes me welcome anyplace on Earth'. The other such pare of opposites was 'A penny from each makes a beggar fed and rich' (68.5%) and 'Friends go together yet count their money apart' (31.5%). It seems that to the residents of St. Petersburg wealth is incompatible with morality and 'equality in poverty' is more moral to them than 'inequality in wealth'.

Paternalism is understood as the expectation of fatherly care from the state towards its ordinary citizens who play the role of children and whose estimation of the father-state depends, first of all, on how effectively it functions as such. In the 1999 all-Russian poll, 84.7% of the respondents believed that the state should extend its unflagging fatherly care not only to children, the old and the handicapped but also equally to every citizen. This opinion appeared to be universal, not depending on age, sex, the level of education or the place of residence of respondents. Nearly two thirds of those residing in St. Petersburg (60.7%) believed that the financial status of a family depended mostly on the government and not on the efforts of the family's members. Just 30.4% of all respondents had supplemental incomes, despite there being lots of opportunities for initiative in St. Petersburg.

The content analysis of the associations of respondents in the poll conducted in St. Petersburg in 2000 revealed that 48.3% of them were resentful of the government as of a bad father because it 'does not provide jobs for people' or 'humiliates people with unemployment'. Most respondents, with the exception of young male businessmen, had a basic stereotype of 'the good' as 'the fair distribution of incomes'.

According to polls, the current President of Russia is perceived as a kind though strict father who is deceived by 'bad' corrupted officials. Whatever a popular leader does, to the people it is justified by that he, as the father who is their own, has the right to punish or pardon as he wills. The tradition of perceiving the leader this way dates back to Peter the Great. While in pre-revolutionary Russia for a noble to make a career or for a peasant to survive they had to 'listen to their superiors' and 'be loyal', in the USSR the same things were called 'work discipline'.

Sociologists say the Soviet system allowed a citizen to remain socially infantile. On the other hand, now the social upward mobility and financial well-being of a person directly depend on his or her individual initiative. And this is why so many citizens feel unhappy as children abandoned by their parents. For this to change may take a much longer time than just getting used to social inequality.

Etatism is closely related to paternalism and is one's special perception of the state as a great power assuring, first of all, national consolidation. To a Russian person, the great consolidating power of the state is the rationalisation of sorts of one's ethnic feelings. In the research titled 'The National Self-awareness of the Russian People' done according to the method of free characteristics followed by a content analysis, the conception of values related to the historical past was used as an 'indication' of 'historical memory' and the indirect indication of the modality of orientation toward the consolidating state.

It was found out that to the respondents the Great Patriotic War was the central event of the national history making them (59.8%) infinitely proud of the state and the people. To just 2.1% of St. Petersburg's residents the war was associated with the tragedy of the siege of Leningrad and the bitterness of losses. Rather characteristically, the war is remembered not just by those who lived then but also by the young (37.1%). In the pre-revolutionary history of Russia, the greatest event referred to as such by 10.6% of respondents was the Patriotic War of 1812. The two wars were not only associated with the heroism of those who fought in them but also with the sense of national unity.

This way history serves as a compensation of sorts for what people lack in their everyday lives. One out of every five or six people perceived Russia not as the cradle of the nation and the birthplace of many great poets and scientists but only as a great superpower. About 5% of St. Petersburg's residents replied they were proud of all Russia's military victories without exception, from the Ice Battle to the fall of Berlin. The memory of the great victories as if alleviates national resentment resulting from the collapse of the USSR, which to some St. Petersburg residents (11.3%) was the most bitter loss among all the other consequences of Perestroika.

Nostalgia for Russia's great-superpower past of 14.7% of respondents is also an unconscious compensation for true or imagined humiliation before the West. People are ashamed of the pittance thrown their way by the International Monetary Fund. They are irritated by store signs in foreign languages and by Russia's lackey's stance before the West, which in the Russian consciousness is the antithesis of being a superpower. Generally, to a Russian, the West is not a geographical term but an equivalent of some spirit, the way of life, the style of behaviour and the way of self-realisation, which is 'not ours'. This approach also dates back to the time of Peter the Great. In our time, position toward the mythologized West splits our society in two.

During the associative experiment in the year 2000 involving 783 respondents, a noticeable symbolic distance between the West and Russia was revealed, the mythologized West perceived sooner as 'evil' than as 'good'. To obtain the symbolic associative lines, two uncompleted sentences were offered: 'To the West, Russia is:' and 'To Russia, the West is:' This resulted in the following modal responses: To the West, Russia is: raw-stock base (9.5%), a cow to be milked (6.8%), enigma (6.5%) and feeding rack (5%). The ratio between negative and positive responses was 93.2% to 6.8%. To Russia, the West is: enemy (14%), economic assistance (11.5%), bad example (10.9%), and a school of life (8.5%). The ratio between negative and positive responses was 69.7% to 30.3%.

Comparing these responses we see that 'we' believe that 'their' attitude toward 'us' is just as bad as 'ours' toward 'them', if not worse. On the other hand, displaying negative attitudes toward and distancing ourselves from the West as we do, we still do not mind taking advantage of the West's financial resources (to :'the West is:', there were responses like 'rescuers when we need them' or 'the bottomless money-bag'). Remarkably, the combinations of diametrically opposed responses, such as 'enemy' and 'a hope for development' or 'dangerous lure' and 'life-belt' in the answers of the same respondents occurred in 30% of the total number.

Then again, 'we' are unconsciously proud of our being so mysterious. To the West, Russia is: 'an unexplainable natural mystery', 'brain-buster', 'sphinx', etc., while to Russia, the West is: 'normal good life', 'good roads', 'good-looking picture', etc. That is, to so mysterious 'us' the West is just trivial and boring. Also, positive responses toward the West, such as 'a goal for us to achieve' or 'an example for us to follow', came exclusively from young (25 to 35) male businessmen and financiers. People of the same age but of different occupations and social statuses, such as students or state employees, were far more critical, leaving alone other social, age and sex groups.

Interestingly, 72.3% of all respondents were sure the West was treacherously unfriendly towards Russia, just 25.1% believing otherwise and 2.6% having no opinion. Remarkably, in Russia one can only be either pro or contra the West, without the third alternative, so to say. Among the young, the number of those suspicious of the West was also predominant (56%) and that allows us saying this is a basic index in our national mentality.

In the fall of 1998, two thirds (67.8%) of the polled residents of St. Petersburg thought Russia must try and preserve her status as a superpower even though it might worsen her relations with the West. Somewhat less (65.2%) believed this would require achieving law and order and therefore toughening the regime in the country. In the year 2000, the poll did not contain a question about this, yet indirectly an orientation toward a strong consolidating state showed. For instance, 58.9% of the respondents welcomed the return to the music of the anthem of the USSR (the answers from 'totally approve' to 'sooner approve than not'). These were opposed by just 20.6% and 30.5% couldn't care less.

We expected that a motif of the war in Chechnya might appear in response to the uncompleted suggestions like 'What is bad in Russia is:' And it did: in 3 responses out of 783.1 guess tough policies toward separatism agree with the etatism of the Russian public and that is why they are supported. This may be where the secret of the stable popularity of the President Putin lies. Crisis mentality is internally contradictive. What is clear, however, is that psychologically people take the transformation of their lives rather hard. This is the reason for the constantly growing psychological uneasiness and uncertainty as to what may follow. Today, this is the predominant condition of the majority of the citizens of Russia that, regretfully, we are taking with us into the 21st century.

PEOPLE OF BELORUSSIA

Have you ever given thought to Byelorussians, not as your parents, brothers and sisters, friends or fellow-villagers, but in general as people with a peculiar character, as people speaking one and the same tongue, having the same past, present and future?!

The population of Byelorussia is also made up of Russians, who live mainly in the cities, of Lithuanians, whose villages are found in the Astravets and Radun Districts, of Jews and Latvians, in places to the north-west of Vitebsk, and of Ukrainians, in some villages to the south of Gomel, and certain small townships in the Pinsk and Stolin neighbourhoods.

There are also Tartars in Byelorussia. They are descendants of those who were once taken prisoner in Batu's time,and; later during Vytautas' raids, and who lived in a special settlement in our country. Up until recent times they differed only in religions (now even this characteristic is gone) and sometimes in names and nicknames in which one could with difficulty catch a hint of their origin.

Have you ever thought what kind of person a Byelorussian is? What kind of a people are they? As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to give an answer to this question, for it is one that can hardly be answered at all.

Each one behaves according to his individual character, the wise reason in a wise and individual manner, but the fools — like elsewhere.

Consequently, generalizations are not necessary.

However, having travelled far and wide over the Republic, and having made the acquaintance of thousands of people, I make bold to name certain features that are rather typical of the Byelorussian character proper.

The northern Byelorussian is rather tall as a rule, some lanky fellows standing two metres high. In the south you can come across people of middle height, most of them stocky, and I repeat that this is by no means a general rule but merely a predominant feature, however the greater part of them are all thickset. Over the past decades there has been a noticeable trend towards an increase in the average height, like everywhere else.

Dark people among the Byelorussians are rather rare. More often than not you meet them in the Polesye, to the south of the Pripet and, for some reason or other, mainly among men, also in certain places around Grodno people are "rooks", they say. Some scientists regard this as evidence of vestiges of the ancient Yatsvegiari blood. Light auburn and even fair hair is prevalent with Byelorussians. Dark auburn and brown-haired people are rarer. Similarly the colour of the eyes is mostly grey, pale blue, or dark blue.

The general appearance is gentle, and the constitution may seem, at first glance, a little delicate, but this is deceptive. The show of outward strength that might impress you for a moment and soon vanish, is substituted here by endurance, wiriness, and staying power. Where another person might give up, the Byelorussian will stick it out. Otherwise in ancient times they would not have survived in the midst of these thick forests and boundless swamps, on this unprolific land. This hardening has become a permanent part of their character. Not for nothing were Byelorussians, even in old times, considered indispensable for such hard tasks as earth-clearing and timber-drifting. Later also it was turned to good account, for instance in unbearably difficult war situations, and in partisan warfare.

However, one can occasionally come across a real Hercules, who can bend horseshoes, and twist steel rods round your arm.

Our countryman is also possessed by a zeal for all kinds of work. It would be more correct to say, an ox-like perseverence in it. Construe this in the best possible sense. The unfertile land would not easily yield good harvests. To make a new field one was compelled, and occasionally is nowadays, to hew out a clearing. That means cutting down the trees, grubbing out the roots, clearing; away the stones, and heaping them up along the field boundaries.

The meagre land has long since made the Byelorussian peasant thrifty, husbanding his resources, putting every small, thing to good purpose, be it merely a small nail, a log of driftwood brought down by the river, and yet it would be a great mistake to call him a mean person.

Byelorussians are noted for their generosity, and their unfailing willingness to come to your aid when you're in trouble. Formerly, when a villager's house was destroyed by a fire, the whole community went to teal the landowner's timber, if. they had none of their own to spare, and in two days built a new house for the victim, and shared their grain with him. Each one measured out as much as he could afford from his granary, so that the man might hold out till spring, and do the sowing. Then everybody contributed a few things from his own household. One gave a mat, another a pillow, yet another a piece of linen or a few pots. They helped make the things that were generally made by the villager himself, such as shoes, spoons, buckets, etc. That was not because they were exceptionally kind, but simply because the community could not survive without it.

Formerly, in time of famine, people .from more prolific places used to come to Byelorussia for help. If our rye is damaged by rains there is a crop of potatoes on sandy soil, and oats; if there are no potatoes, we have mushrooms or fish, and if these are in short supply, game supplies the deficit. A real famine never broke out unless the country was devastated by war or everything was carried off by a wicked landowner or official, and even in this case people knew how to weather the storm, to put things by, to cut and contrive, for this, was exactly the situation in which the Byelorussian thrift stood them in good stead. I've never heard of a starving person who was allowed to leave a neighbour's house with his hands empty.

That is in time of need. But in ordinary circumstances too, all our visitors note our hospitality as one of our most salient features, which not infrequently may even grow burdensome for the guest. "A guest in the house is a God in the house" — and disgrace falls upon the home where everything possible is not done to please the visitor. "The Byelorussian is known for hospitality, a mood of gaiety and trust, although the latter is not always immediately gained. He will never harbour any rancour, and it leaps to the eye of anyone who comes in contact with him. In general, he has a gentle nature."

Many an enemy, for they have been numerous throughout our history, has often pinned his hopes on this "natural meekness". One of the members of the Nazi government wrote plainly that, as a people, the Byelorussians were inert and pliable, kind, weak-willed and quiet, should be subject to earliest liquidation or deportation and that this was expected to be a rather easy action because any more or less organized or sustained resistance was ruled out.

To return to the Byelorussian charact­er, its hospitality is that of one kind person towards another.

True, many ancient customs of hospit­ality are slowly going out of use. A city dweller is often not acquainted with the person living next door. However, even today you would hardly find a home where they would hesitate to give a guest an open-handed welcome. Sometimes the situation even grows ridiculous, and the Byelorussian makes his excessive hospit­ality the butt of his own derisive com­ment: "A guest is like a slave: he will keep quiet although you make him lie on a feather-bed", "I enjoyed my visit except that there was no compulsion" (they were not insistently prevailed upon, almost forced to eat and drink, although too shy). "The guest will sit where he is told, even in the corner, but the host, like a boil, will take his place where he pleases", "When entertaining a nice visitor, even the host will regale himself too", "Such a wonder­ful moonlight night — if I were a guest I'd be getting along", "The first week the guest is gold, the second — silver and the third — copper, although he's preparing to leave for home".

After all, these are only jokes. Visiting is visiting.

Generally speaking, Byelorussians are characterized by an innate respect or other peoples, and tolerance towards those who hold a different opinion. Naturally, there are deplorable exceptions but these are just exceptions, and nothing else.