Напишите реферат и аннотацию к данному тексту.

Text B.

1. Прочтите и переведите следующий текст:

THE RACE FOR THE BOTTOM

 Cast your eye over a list of the bitterest trade rows of the past few years. Many concern not the traditional tools of protection, such as tariffs, import quotas and export subsidies, but differences in domestic regulations. For example, rules supposedly intended to protect consumers from dangerous products are some­times seen by foreigners as trade barriers. Plenty of America’s frequent spats with Japan stem from American companies’ inability to break down the ties between Japanese manufacturers, distributors and retailers; Japan’s antitrust authorities, the Americans say, are slack.

Such disputes are likely to occur more often in future. One reason is the growth of international trade: as national econo­mies become more integrated, firms will complain more often about the rising cost of having to adapt to different rules in dif­ferent markets.

More serious is the growing worry, es­pecially in America, that countries in which the regulation of labour standards tends to be weak, and protection of the environment scanty, will have an “un­fair” advantage in trade and in attracting direct inviestment. Some attribute the fall in the wages of unskilled American males, at a time when rich workers’ earnings have risen, to competition from countries with slacker regulations. Thus fear of regulatory protection on the one hand, and cheap imports on the other, is making some politicians, businessmen and labour leaders argue that more harmonisation of national standards would be a good thing.

But would it? In some respects, per­haps. In a recent book Alan Sykes, a law professor at the University of Chicago, shows how national product standards and regulations can act as trade barriers. Frequently, he argues, there is no need for governments to intervene at all. The mar­ket can be relied upon to ensure, say, that software and computers are compatible, or that goods are of sufficient quality; if they are not, consumers will not buy them. In such instances, differences in na­tional regulations that are unnecessary in the first place are likely to hobble trade.

Where regulation can be justified - for example, in ensuring that food is safe to eat or that children’s nightclothes are not inflammable - so might differences be­tween countries’ rules. The reason, says Mr Sykes, is that consumers’ preferences and incomes vary from one country to the next: just as the market might produce goods of lower quality in poorer coun­tries, or with differences tailored to na­tional tastes, so governments should re­spond in the same way.

Yet such diversity has costs as well as benefits: firms find it expensive to ensure that their products comply with regula­tions in every country in which their wares are sold. Much of the time, reckons Mr Sykes, it is impossible to decide whether international differences are jus­tified. Sometimes, though, they clearly are not. Too often, they are designed to cod­dle local producers at the expense of for­eigners and the local consumers they are supposed to protect. In one celebrated example, the Thai government once used an anti-smoking campaign to justify taxes and restrictions on imported cigarettes - but not on locally made ones.

A new paper by Jagdish Bhagwati, an economist at Columbia University in New York, examines the demands for re­ducing other forms of diversity: structural differences between economies, notably Japan’s keiretsu system of closely related companies; labour standards; and envi­ronmental rules. Not surprisingly to anyone familiar with Mr Bhagwati’s work, he finds them less than compelling.

In part, he attributes America’s attacks on the structure of the Japanese economy, and its demands for stricter labour and green laws in poorer countries, to Ameri­ca’s diminishing share of world output. This makes it more reluctant to play by the rules of free trade.

Green is good, but

    However, Mr Bhagwati also considers several more respectable motives for wanting harmonisation. Some Americans might argue that Mexico, say, should have higher standards of environmental protection, or tougher labour laws, because they believe that Mexicans have a right to the same air quality, or wages, as Americans. Or they might believe, out of concern for humanity as a whole, that Mexicans should do their bit to protect the global environment. Either way, some advocate the threat of trade sanctions to force Mexico to mend its ways.

    Mr Bhagwati says this is wrong. It is fine, he says, for lobbyists to ask their own governments to cough up for good causes. But in this instance, they are asking them to make foreigners do the coughing. That makes it likely that those who would benefit from such trade protection will try to put more demands on poorer countries. Moreover, sanctions may not lead to less pollution or better working conditions: if Mexico spends more on clean air than it can afford, or raises its labour standards, its ability to grow and improve its record later will be damaged.

    A further reason for wanting less diversity is a fear of a «race to the bottom» in environmental and labour standards. Multinational companies, the argument runs, will be attracted to countries with slack rules; countries where standards are high now will have to relax them or see factories close. The result ? Miserably paid workers everywhere, and a ruined planet.

    Maybe. Mr Bhagwati points out that the «bottom» is just one of several theoretically possible outcomes, and that the evidence of such a race is far from conclusive. If the American government wants to protect the environment and workers’ rights, he suggests, that rather than force poor countries to adopt higher standards, it would be better to require American firms operating abroad to adopt the same employment and environmental practices as they would at home. (Indeed, plenty already do.) If the idea is to make the planet greener and workers less poor, surely they would not object ?

VOCABULARY